Urban Governance and Turning African Cities Around: City of Johannesburg

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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEPP</td>
<td>Built Environment Performance Plan</td>
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<td>BRT</td>
<td>Bus Rapid Transit</td>
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<td>C40</td>
<td>Cities Climate Leadership Group</td>
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<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
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<td>CIDs</td>
<td>City Improvement District</td>
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<td>CIPAS</td>
<td>Capital Investment Priority Areas</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Capabilities Support Agents</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>Development Facilitation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFC</td>
<td>Fiscal and Financial Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCRO</td>
<td>Gauteng City Regional Observatory</td>
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<td>GMS</td>
<td>Growth Management Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICLEI</td>
<td>Local Governments for Sustainability</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Johannesburg Development Agency</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Plan</td>
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<td>SAMWU</td>
<td>South African Municipal Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCLG</td>
<td>United Cities and Local Governments</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAR</td>
<td>South African Rand</td>
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1 The authors are grateful and indebted to Judy Twycross for editing an early version of this report and to Gaelen Pinnock for producing the illustrated timeline. All mistakes are our own and the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of PASGR, the African Centre for Cities or University of Cape Town.
Abstract
Johannesburg enjoys an international profile as an exemplar of urbanism in the Global South and as a place of industry, commerce and employment on the African continent. What is seldom mentioned is that in 1998 the local authority was technically bankrupt as the result of urbanization, a culture of not paying rates and an experiment in metropolitan governance and budgeting that left Johannesburg’s civil service demoralized and ineffective.

The study traces the dramatic recovery from this fiscal and governance crisis. The initial response was technocratic and austere, aimed at establishing budget accountability, recouping debts and avoiding any new expenditure. It culminated in the first Johannesburg unicity with a single authority, tax base and significantly improved balance sheet; and brought stability and institutional rigour that has seen a rapid increase in the city’s capital account. This has enabled the municipality to pursue more ambitious social and infrastructural programmes aimed at addressing the city’s deep-seated spatial and labour market problems. The Corridors of Freedom and Jozi@Work programmes, documented below as the product of Johannesburg’s turnaround, are informed by a degree of understanding of structural urban challenges, ambition and commitment that distinguishes Johannesburg from South Africa’s other major cities.

In this sense Johannesburg not only experienced a turn-around from its crisis of 1998, but has used the platform created by this recovery to pursue programmes of urban renewal and competitiveness. The extent to which these programmes are inclusive of all citizens, and particularly the poorest, is contested but the City of Johannesburg’s current leadership is committed to becoming more inclusive and better connected. The sustained public spirited ambition and proactivity that informs these programmes is all the more remarkable against the backdrop of a national leadership struggling with incumbency, and that is withdrawing into factionalism and reactive and divisive race-based strategies.

Key words: turn-around, City of Johannesburg, governance, fiscal model, Corridors of Freedom, Jozi@work
1. Introduction
The study set out to expound the South African City of Johannesburg’s ‘turn-around’. It forms one piece of a broader project examining the ‘emergent governance prospects’ of Johannesburg, Luanda and Lagos. The ‘turn-around cities’ theme is a figure of speech that captures the effect of complex phenomena.2

The analysis scrutinises the economic, institutional, governance, personnel and demographic changes that defined Johannesburg between 1990 and 2015 with focus on Johannesburg’s recovery from its fiscal crisis subsequent to 1998. South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994 is an important part of this change, as is the ‘Africa Rising’ narrative used to describe the impacts of high commodity prices on African countries between 2005 and 2014. The primary focus of this study, however, is the interventions that allowed Johannesburg to not only recover from the 1998 crisis, but also build the capital reserves to undertake catalytic projects aimed at and addressing Johannesburg’s problematic legacies. Two specific flagship projects, the Corridors of Freedom and Jozi@Work, are showcased as a part of the study.

Section 2 describes Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality within South Africa’s governance, highlighting the specific roles and responsibilities of local government and how Johannesburg has pursued this mandate. Section 3 provides a timeline of Johannesburg’s turn-around, beginning in the 1970’s and progressing to Johannesburg 2015. Section 4 draws on the available data to provide an objective assessment of Johannesburg’s turn-around. Section 5 identifies two flagship projects that capture the essence of Johannesburg’s turn-around. Section 6 concludes with reflections on the nature, extent and significance of Johannesburg’s turn-around. Annex A describes the ‘turn-around’ concept as prescribed in the terms of reference and the project’s Framework Paper. The concept has had to be standardized to enable comparisons with the two other cities in the study – Lagos and Luanda. It also outlines the research methodology.

‘Turn-around cities’ is an intentionally emotive framing of Johannesburg’s transition. The concept imbues notions of change, resilience and hope in a deliberate contrast to the dystopian urban critique that has become the norm for much of South Africa’s, and Africa’s, research (Murray, 2004; Murray, 2011; Rubin, 2014; Visser and Rogerson, 2014; Crush et al., 2015). Similarly the focus is in stark contrast to the historical African development focus on rural and agricultural transformation.

The methodology applied to the ‘turn-around cities’ framing is described in Annex A and in the project’s Framework Paper (Pieterse, 2015). The brief required a specific focus on “the question of infrastructural readiness of key urban nodes, coupled with an aggressive push for urban governments to ensure a favourable operating environment for (international) capital… and the tough questions of how [urban governments] are steering and regulating all these new investments.” The research drew on the considerable literature on the City of Johannesburg and interviews with current and former City officials, academics and business people.

The criteria for evaluating the 'turn-around' trope include a marked change in GDP, public investment in infrastructure, political and investor support for extraordinary projects, effective governance and international recognition. The Framework Paper suggests a 5-10 year horizon in order to distinguish the turn-around from longer-term trends.

The study found the recovery from the 1998 fiscal crises to be both profound and remarkable. In technical terms, Johannesburg clearly qualifies as a ‘turn-around city’. Significantly, Johannesburg’s political leadership has applied the increasingly robust post-1998 fiscal platform to embark on an ambitious plan to redress the labour and spatial legacies of the apartheid city. Inevitably the city’s heterogeneous and disparate population has experienced this effort very differently, and its success is not yet (and could not be) definitive.

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2 The citations in this paragraph are taken from the study’s Framework Paper by Edgar Pieterse, “Urban Governance and Turning African Cities Around” (1 April 2015).
The study does, however, explore the importance of the effort in the context of South African cities that have unwittingly replicated pre-existing divides in terms of Johannesburg's role in the national transition since 1994.³

2. A snapshot of Johannesburg within the national context
Johannesburg is South Africa's primary city, but does not command classical primacy due to the legislative, economic and historical importance that resides with other South African cities. Johannesburg's place in the South African public's sub-conscious is linked to the city's historic role in the country's mining industry and successful apartheid resistance – most notably in the suburb of Soweto. As a city with co-existing affluence and poverty⁴, and a city that has had its social constructs and spatial form shaped by mineral deposits, labour exploitation, exposure to the global commodity and financial cycle, urbanisation and housing shortfalls, political and ethnic contestation and modernizing and traditional forces, Johannesburg represents an important "exemplar of urbaniy in the Global South" (Harrison et al., 2015, p.4; Everatt, 2015).

As a result of its history and recent changes, Johannesburg also offers a portent of future urbanism (Robinson, 2003; Nuttal and Mbembe, 2008). The relationship between Johannesburg's institutional status, demographic profile, spatial change and economy is inextricably linked to the city's turn-around subsequent to 1998.

2.1 Institutional status
The democratic transition in South Africa in 1994 was the catalyst for a set of radical governance reforms. Prior to the transition, local governments in South Africa facilitated and reinforced national policies of racial segregation and economic exclusion at the local scale (Binza, 2005; Nyalunga, 2006). The adoption of South Africa's first constitution in 1996 ushered in several important changes: local government was designated as an equal and autonomous sphere of government; local authorities were organized on a non-racial basis and rationalized from 1,262 to 283 municipalities (including district municipalities); and municipalities covered the entire country providing each citizen with legislated access to a local government that was mandated to provide them with basic services (Powell, 2012).

The idea of 'developmental local government' was reinforced in subsequent legislation including the Municipal Demarcation Act (1998), Municipal Structures Act (1998)⁵ and Municipal Systems Act (2000). Some of this legislation was informed by experiments with metropolitan local governance in Johannesburg. The new legislation gave local authorities wide-ranging powers, but required that this be exercised in relation with other spheres of government and the Constitution. Section 152 and 153 of the Constitution are clear that local governments are to "deliver accountable and democratically elected government for communities; ...ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; promote social and economic development; promote a safe and healthy environment; and encourage the participation of communities and community organisations in the business of local government" (RSA, 1996).

Within the legislated three spheres of government, the City of Johannesburg was defined as a Category A Municipality (or Metropolitan Municipality) responsible for planning, service provision, regulation and revenue management. Table 1 contains details on the specific areas of regulation and service provision.

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⁴ Everatt (2003, 2015) and Wray and Storie (2012) have shown that there is no consensual or clear definition of poverty in South Africa, and have made the case that a multiple deprivation index that denotes inability to access a basket of basic services and opportunities including income and employment, shelter, health and social development, education and disaster risk services might be more appropriate in identifying need.

⁵ Updated in 2003.
Table 1: Mandates for “Category A” Municipalities (Metropolitan Authorities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Provisions</th>
<th>Regulation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Free basic services (water and electricity)</td>
<td>Traffic regulations and parking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal public works</td>
<td>Street trading</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal public transport</td>
<td>Noise pollution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal health clinics</td>
<td>Building regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipal airports</td>
<td>Planning permission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roads and Storm water management</td>
<td>Food and liquor licensing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal</td>
<td>Licensing of dogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic waste water and sewage disposal systems</td>
<td>Control of public nuisances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, reticulation and street lighting</td>
<td>Billboards and the display of advertisements in public places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefighting services</td>
<td>Imposing surcharges on fees, rates on property and, other taxes, levies and duties as permitted by national legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks, sports facilities, libraries, cemeteries and crematoria</td>
<td>Transparency and accountability in the fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleansing and municipal abattoirs</td>
<td>Regulation of child care facilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schedules 4b and 5b ‘local government matters’ specified in the South African Constitution (RSA, 1996)

Significantly, certain land assets and the responsibility for key mandates including energy generation\(^6\), education, hospitals and the environment continued to lie with either National or Provincial Government; and Metropolitan Authorities were required to share responsibility for housing, transport and water infrastructure with Provincial Governments. This has caused difficulties for progressive and ambitious cities such as Johannesburg seeking to create coherent and inclusive urban forms and to provide well-located and affordable housing (Layman, 2003).

Local authorities in South Africa raise revenue through property taxes, service charges and transfers from the national fiscus. They may not run deficit budgets. Under the new legislation, Metropolitan Municipalities are on the frontline of service delivery. Success is contingent upon retaining services to a comparatively small set of tax-paying citizens so as to protect the existing rates base, while cross-subsidising the extension of services to historically disadvantaged communities (FFC, 2011; Everatt, 2015).

It is the difficulty of striking this balance in Johannesburg, and South Africa’s other cities, that has seen the 50 percent rise in ‘transitional structures’ between 2001 and 2011; testimony to the inability to keep pace of rising urban demand for low-cost rental accommodation and the corresponding construction of informal rooms attached to formal houses (Gotz et al., 2015). In 2011 Johannesburg was home to roughly 100,000 informal housing units and 60,000 ‘transitional structures’.

2.2 Demographic

Johannesburg’s population is estimated to be 4.7 million\(^7\). The city sits in a conurbation – Gauteng City Region – comprising Tshwane and Ekurhuleni Municipalities that is home to almost 13 million people (GCRO, 2015). Between 1996 and 2011 the national population grew by 28 percent, but Johannesburg’s population expanded by 68.4 percent; swelled by young

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\(^6\) Local authorities are responsible for energy distribution and sales to end-users.  
\(^7\) Based on the 2011 census figure of 4.4 million and an annual growth rate of 1.3 percent.
work seekers. In 2011 almost half (48 percent) of the city’s inhabitants had been born outside of the city and 12.7 percent held foreign citizenship (StatsSA, 2012), confirming Johannesburg as a ‘city of migrants’ (Tau, 2015; Crush et al., 2015). Just over half the population was male. The proportion of male migrant workers reflects Johannesburg’s status as a place of perceived economic opportunity. The city’s migratory patterns, both internal and international, add complexity to its demographic profile and municipal service delivery (Beall et al., 2002; CDE, 2014).

The municipality reports Johannesburg’s urban density to be 2,639 people per km². Officials use this statistic to echo the South African refrain of urban sprawl and associated service delivery challenges. The expansion of the urban footprint is unequivocal, but a number of analyses suggest that physical expansion has been accompanied by simultaneous densification (Angel et al., 2012) and that actual population densities might be as high as 6,479 people per km² (Harrison et al., 2015). The space occupied by Johannesburg increased by 35 percent (24,212 hectares) between 1991 and 2009; but while relative growth has been faster on the urban periphery, the absolute growth in population has been higher in the urban core (Mubiwa, 2014; Gotz et al., 2015).

The expansion of Johannesburg’s urban footprint has been driven by the 96 percent increase in the number of households between 1996 and 2011 and accelerated by state-built housing in the south and south-west (Cosmo City, Soweto and Orange Farm), and affluent private estates in the north. Average household size reduced from 3.5 to 2.9 over the same period (Harrison et al., 2015; Gotz et al., 2015). The fiscal inability of the State to extend services to all households has seen a concomitant increase in informality, although not in the inner-city where land shortages and rising property prices ensured that informality actually decreased between 2001 and 2011 (Durand-Lasserve and Royston, 2002; Gotz et al., 2015).

The relationship between Johannesburg’s demographic and spatial change, investment and coherent governance is central to the city’s turn-around and is revisited in Sections 4 and 5.

2.3 Economic status
Johannesburg is the urban core of the Gauteng City Region, home to South Africa’s finance and industrial sectors and the major service centre to the country’s residual mining industry. Johannesburg is the wealthiest of South Africa’s eight Metropolitan Municipalities and is legitimately referred to as South Africa’s ‘economic engine room’. In the public perception Johannesburg remains a city of economic opportunity. Johannesburg contains 8 percent of South Africa’s population and 12.8 percent of the employed population, but generates 13 percent of the country’s GDP (StatsSA, 2012). Per capita income of USD 16,370 in 2014 was well above the national average of USD 6,086 (World Bank, 2014).

The Johannesburg economy grew by 87.7 percent (in real terms) between 1996 and 2011, outstripping national growth of 61.8 percent. Johannesburg has benefited from the global trend towards economic financialisation (Epstein and Jayadev, 2005). It has been growth in the tertiary sector (finance, insurance, real estate and business services) that has fuelled growth since democracy. In 2011 this sector contributed 76.1 percent of the city’s Gross Value Add, the secondary sector 21.9 percent and the primary sector just 2 percent of which just 1.6 percent was mining; challenging the popular perception that mining drives Johannesburg’s economy.

Over the past two decades, a fifth of the national growth in employment has taken place in Johannesburg while the broader Gauteng Province accounted for over 40 percent of this employment growth (Quintec, 2014). In spite of this, unemployment in the city remains obsturately high at 25 percent; 42 per cent if those that have given up looking for work are included under the definition of unemployment. Youth unemployment is at 32 percent, excluding disillusioned job seekers.

Dependency ratios⁸ in Johannesburg (37.1 percent) are lower than other South African cities (39.8 percent), but low dependency and high mean per capita income conceal social

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⁸ The ratio of working people to those outside of the working age or unemployed.
inequality (CoJ, 2015a). The city’s Gini Co-efficient was 0.63 in 2013, which is higher than the national figure (Figure 1), suggesting that the mode of economic growth in South Africa’s ‘economic engine room’ accentuates the country’s general social inequality.

As urbanisation and the associated ‘financialisation’ replaces industrialisation as the engine of economic growth and social change, Johannesburg’s economic growth has been party to the tightly choreographed relationship between property development and the expansion of the finance sector (Epstein and Jayadev, 2005; Ballard and Jones, 2015). It is this phenomenon that has replicated many of the observed spatial and socio-economic divides.

**Figure 1: Percentage of Johannesburg households in different income bands (2011)**

![Graph showing percentage of households by income band](source: StatsSA 2011)

Johannesburg’s Human Development Index (a composite of education, health and income) is 0.74 and has improved moderately over the past decade. Similarly, the number of people living below the poverty line has declined by 16.2 percent over the past decade, but a quarter of the city’s population continues to live below the poverty line9.

3. **Timeline of Johannesburg’s turn-around**

Implicit in the notion of a turn-around is that the current state represents a relatively new set of circumstances. The peer-reviewed literature is clear regarding Johannesburg’s state of flux and emergence (Beall et al., 2002; Tomlinson et al., 2003, Harrison et al., 2015). Interviewees and the popular media too recognize Johannesburg’s transition even if some suggest that the changes are not yet definitive (Grootes, 2016). There is a similar accord that 1997-1998 was an institutional and fiscal nadir. Understanding the events that led up to, and followed, this low-point in Johannesburg is critical to the turn-around analysis.

**1970s-1990:** The Soweto Uprising in June 1976, led by students protesting their language of tuition, focused global attention on the apartheid regime and exposed the cultivated image of Johannesburg as a flourishing, cosmopolitan gold mining town (Chipkin, 1993; Rogerson, 1996). The State’s violent response rendered the suburb of Soweto the centre of the national campaign against apartheid10. Self-organised township movements called ‘civics’ emerged as the unit of resistance in the wake of the Soweto Uprising. The apartheid regime’s efforts at co-opting the civics included the offer of municipal status and the right to elect councillors in 1986, but were mostly shunned. The resistance campaign continued to undermine the City of Johannesburg’s global image and to fracture governance efforts. The ‘White City War’ in 1987 was followed by the formalisation of the defiance

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9 Statistics South Africa calculates the poverty line by determining the food and non-food items that are essential for daily survival. The line is currently set at ZAR 779 per month (roughly USD 2 per day) per person.

10 In the year following 16 June 1976, 575 people were killed and 2,389 were wounded in the Soweto vicinity (Lapping, 1987).
campaign and a programme of ‘ungovernability’ under the Mass Democratic Movement that included coordinated rates and electricity boycotts.

Johannesburg’s White suburbs and finance sector were initially cloistered from the resistance and associated violence. In 1990 the Johannesburg CBD remained home to the headquarters of 65 of the 100 largest companies listed on the national stock exchange (Bremner, 2000). From a governance and fiscal perspective, however, the city was untenable. The manufacturing economy’s dependence on labour ensured that this sector shrunk from R3.4 billion in 1980 to R2.5 billion in 1994 as workers joined the defiance campaign and trade sanctions began to impact (Pienaar, 1994). Multi-national companies, under increasing international pressure, slowly withdrew from the country.

Nationally, the besieged apartheid regime had begun negotiations, and in Johannesburg the defiance campaign eventually brought the apartheid authorities to the negotiating table. Negotiations led to the signing of the Soweto Accord between the Soweto Civic Association, the Transvaal Provincial Authority and Eskom (National Energy Utility) in 1990. The accord saw all rates and electricity arrears written off, and a discounted flat rate for electricity introduced for Soweto. It also formalised talks between the Metropolitan Chamber, civic organizations, the Transvaal Provincial Authority and churches regarding the need for a democratic and unified city governed by a metropolitan authority capable of redressing apartheid’s spatial legacy. These ideas were assimilated in the eventual formation of a unified City of Johannesburg in 2001. However, the process was neither immediate nor linear.

1990-1997: In 1990, 15 distinct councils ran what is today called the City of Johannesburg. In 1991 the Group Areas Act, the centre-piece of race-based restrictions on settlement and movement, was repealed but there was no immediate mass migration into cities such as Johannesburg (Stats SA, 2001).

Following South Africa’s first democratic elections (1994), the African National Congress (ANC) tabled the country’s Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP). The plan was clear on what was required to ensure “integrated compact cities”. It stipulated that “new low income housing [provided by the State] should be situated near employment wherever possible” and referred to the need for “suitably located land for housing”. The RDP recognised the need for “democratic government [to] intervene [in the land market] to facilitate such access [and] break-up …land monopolies” (RSA, 1994). With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the plan underestimated the difficulty and the cost of realizing this vision and overestimated the local government’s capacity at the time to intervene coherently in land markets. It remains, however, difficult to imagine a more prescient strategy for South Africa’s cities than that outlined in the RDP in 1994. Certainly it is a vision that remained with Johannesburg’s subsequent city leaders, and has been revisited in the City’s spatial strategies subsequent to 2006.

In 1995, Johannesburg’s 15 councils were consolidated into eight ‘Transitional Metropolitan Structures’ by the Local Government Transition Act (1993) in an effort to link a former White area with an emerging Black area so as to enable cross-subsidised budgets and integration. Soweto was included as part of the new Southern Metropolitan Transitional Local Council. At the time, previously-White councils spent ZAR 600 per resident and were 90 percent self-sufficient, while previously-Black councils spent ZAR 100 per resident and were 10 percent self-sufficient (CoJ, 2015a). Within councils, governance modalities and mindsets remained largely unreformed and tensions between newly appointed ANC councillors and the incumbents from opposition parties frustrated decision-making. Council governance was further confounded by power struggles within the ANC as it transitioned from a liberation movement to a governing party. Not all civic leaders could be accommodated in the formalized authority and civics themselves grappled with their role alongside formal local government (Mangcu, 2003).

Figure 2: Timeline of events leading up to the Johannesburg crisis (1976-1995)
Striking a balance between the need for technocratic, state-led infrastructure and service provision and the black consciousness idea of self-determining citizens proved a source of tension in Johannesburg. The technocratic approach prevailed, entrenching the State-led focus on property development, infrastructure and service delivery that prevails to this day (Mangcu, 2013; Rubin, 2014).

Community participation was one of the casualties of this process, creating enduring tensions between the Municipality and ANC branches marginalised from governance and budget decisions. Significantly, reconstruction efforts took place in the wake of global Socialism's collapse. At the time Johannesburg’s decision makers were exposed to the interests of global capital without a coherent philosophical alternative from which to offer a riposte.

Another idea that was lost during efforts to accommodate community leadership was the need for a strong Metropolitan Council with oversight of the whole city (Tomlinson, 1999). The Transitional Metropolitan Council established in 1995 held little sway over the much stronger local councils. The requirement was that the eight merged councils should balance their books on aggregate. This ambitious fiscal arrangement proved disastrous and saw over-spending and subsequent appeals to neighbouring councils to take responsibility for the deficit – an effective ‘race to the bottom’.

The influx of people no longer encumbered by apartheid restrictions proliferated new development, but the governance melee precluded any strategic spatial or economic planning. On the contrary, the obligation to provide services overwhelmed the conflicted and fiscally weak councils. Planning approval committees had become highly contested; civil servant morale plummeted together with service delivery, accountability and cost-recovery, and communication with residents was non-existent (Todes, 2012; Harrison et al., 2015). The Development Facilitation Act (DFA) was approved in 1995 to enable the land-management required for integration of cities and human settlements. The Act, however, was poorly aligned to the housing subsidy that was itself insufficient for the acquisition of well-located land and did little to impact on urban settlement patterns.

Against this backdrop, many of the rapidly established new developments were inevitably informal (Diepsloot, Orange Farm, Cosmo City) (Ahmed, 2010). The inability to enforce control on Johannesburg’s inner-city made this area attractive to migrant labourers, some of whom had no legal status in the country and no means of entering the property market. In 1986, 15 percent of inner-city Hillbrow’s population was Black (20,000 people). By 1996 this proportion was 95 per cent (Bremner, 2000a). Slumlords assumed control of inner-city properties and charged illegal residents high rates while neglecting building maintenance. Ponte Tower in Berea, a 173 metre, 55 stories cylindrical building that dominates Johannesburg’s skyline became emblematic of the demise. At one stage the building’s courtyard was filled to the third story with refuse, a “gravity-defying dystopia” (Smith, 2015). In the late 1990’s, Ponte was predominantly occupied by Congolese migrants who used small retail outlets and liquor and drug businesses to forge solidarity and send a defiant message to local authorities and local businesses – what Gotz and Simone termed “a parody of belonging” (Gotz and Simone, 2003). The capture of the inner-city by slumlords accelerated capital flight from the CBD.

The reach and mobility of Johannesburg’s new residents was aided by the concomitant rise of the private mini-bus taxi industry comprising 30,000 minibus taxis (15-seater); forming a formidable solidarity and political lobby\(^\text{12}\). The taxi industry’s effectiveness enabled work seekers to settle on cheaper vacant land on the urban periphery, but increasingly mobile commuters compounded the lack of spatial coherence in Johannesburg’s expansion and strained the existing road infrastructure.

Property developers in affluent communities were equally quick to take advantage of lax spatial planning and land-use management. The private finance sector that vacated the CBD relocated in Sandton and Rosebank, precipitating a rush of new up-market gated security settlements in Johannesburg’s northern suburbs (Ahmed and Pienaar, 2015). The corporate

\(^{12}\) Based on estimates for the BRT peer review presented at Metropolis, June 2015.
structures that were built in Sandton and Rosebank were propelled by 'impatient long-term capital' needing a new outlet in a stagnating industrial economy (Goga, 2003) and creating what Tomlinson et al. (2003) referred to as the 'new edge city'.

By 1997 the newly democratized city of Johannesburg was a spatial, fiscal and governance mess exposed by a series of internal and external pressures that coalesced in the budget (Bremner, 2000b). By 1998 the combined city had a ZAR 300 million deficit, a ZAR 405 million overdraft and almost no capital expenditure. The bloated civil service (42,000) was demoralized and overwhelmed by the transition. Revenue collection remained inadequate as City administrators struggled to alter the rates boycott mindset that had been so effective as a defiance campaign. By 1998, the City was unable to pay the National Electricity Utility (Eskom) and 42 percent of Johannesburg’s income was in arrears by at least 240 days. The situation forced the City’s leaders to approach the government of Japan for a loan. This drew the disapproval of South Africa’s National Treasury, which stepped in with a ZAR 523 million grant. The conditions attached to the grant included a radical restructuring programme and a lock-down of the City’s budget (Beall et al., 2000).

The two-tiered local government system, fiscal collapse, the inability to arrest middle-class sprawl, the spread of informal settlements and the demise of the inner-city culminated in the 1998 low-point from which Johannesburg ‘turned around’. At the heart of the governance challenge was the post-democracy search for a fiscal model that redressed inequality and gave meaning to the ideals captured in South Africa’s Constitution while ensuring that the Johannesburg economy remained competitive in the global economy.

As it transpired, Johannesburg’s experiments with metropolitan governance proved critical in informing national efforts to create unified urban centres with a single tax base and budget in South Africa’s large cities.

1998-2000: One of the conditions of the ZAR 523 million, three-year National Treasury grant involved the appointment of a 'Committee of 10' that administered the city. In 1999 Ketso Gordhan was appointed as the new Municipal Manager to head the committee. Mr Gordhan had a reputation for strategic interventions and implementation. In his own words, Gordhan’s brief was to forge a single Metropolitan Council and to restore fiscal stability (Gordhan, 2015, personal communications). The City’s capital budget was non-existent and remained frozen for the initial period after 1998. Shortly into his term, the city produced a three-year strategy, ‘iGoli 2002’ that mapped the proposed turn-around (Beall et al., 2002; Didier et al., 2013).

By the time he was removed from his post in 2000, the City of Johannesburg generated a surplus of ZAR 800 million and was primed to become the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality under a single council. Given that this period initiated the ‘turn-around’ and laid the platform for subsequent catalytic flagship projects, it is worth identifying the specific governance and budgetary innovations that defined it and laid the platform for subsequent catalytic flagship projects:

- Mr Gordhan credits the role of Kenny Mmoinang, ANC Chairperson of the Provincial Legislature, who encouraged him to take difficult decisions while offering ‘protection’ from the internal politics of the ruling party (Gordhan, 2015, personal communication).
- Each line function was required to document assets and their rate of depreciation, and produce consolidated figures for the cost of providing a unit of the respective services (potable water, waste collection, electricity). This information had not previously been available, making budget controls and accountable urban governance impossible.
- The city’s debt was restructured. The overdraft on which the city was paying an interest rate of 21 percent (‘prime rate’ plus 2 percent). He also restructured the city’s pension liabilities from an ‘outcomes-based’ system to a ‘contributions-based’ system. In the process the city’s future liabilities were slashed.
- Using its improved balance sheet the city re-entered the capital market on more favourable terms, some of which were highly innovative. A ZAR 200 million loan was received from Rand Merchant Bank in 2000; secured against the rates that the bank’s various properties paid the city. Had the Municipality been unable to service the loan, the bank would have been entitled to a rates holiday.
A commitment was made to the unions and the ruling party (who were in a national alliance) not to retrench municipal employees. Instead employees were outsourced to service providers. The logistics company, Imperial, was given responsibility for the municipal fleet, for example, in a process that saw the number of vehicles reduced from 6,000 to 1,500 and the availability of vehicles improved from 50 percent to 92 percent.

The city employed private debt collectors on a commission basis to recoup revenue owed to it.

A set of corporatized agencies was established to take responsibility for municipal services and assets. Under the arrangement, which continues today, the city sets the service delivery target while the appointed agency conducts implementation and maintenance based on a negotiated share of the budget. From the outset the agencies were controversial, but they have also proven more nimble with regards to procurement and service delivery.

Soweto’s electricity contract was excluded from Johannesburg’s budget, requiring Soweto to contract directly with ESKOM and insulating the city from the budget liability that had been created by the culture of non-payment for electricity in Soweto (Hunter, personal communication, 2016). In 2015 Soweto’s electricity arrears were ZAR 8 billion (Tau, 2015). Unusually for South Africa, this debt accrues to Eskom and is not reflected on the City of Johannesburg’s books.

The 1998-2000 period arrested the fiscal decline. It also re-empowered State bureaucrats and made them more accountable, simplified the city’s organogram and removed some of the confusion created by political contestation. By 2000, the city had begun 18 upgrading projects, was busy building 2,000 housing units and had established a ‘bad buildings programme’ to transfer illegally occupied and derelict buildings to new owners prepared to invest in restoration and maintenance (Bremner, 2000a).

The efficiencies introduced by the 15 corporatized service delivery agencies enabled accountability and cost recovery, but corporatisation and cost recovery were controversial and decried by the political left as inappropriately ‘neo-liberal’ at a time when previously black suburbs were seeking redress (Didier et al., 2013).

Water meters and prepaid energy meters installed to enhance revenue collection drew the ire of civil society groups. The Soweto and Alexandra Civic Organisations formed the Anti-Privatisation Forum and coined slogans such as ‘Destroy the meter, enjoy the water’ (Bond, 2004, p. 144; Parnell and Robinson, 2006). The more general concern was that the emphasis on austerity and cost recovery would undermine efforts to tackle the service delivery backlog in poor Black suburbs. The allegation of ‘techno-managerialism’ frequently associated with the neo-liberalism that was institutionalised by Ketso Gordhan, continues to be laid at the city’s door to this day (Mangcu, 2013).

What is sometimes missed in this ex post analysis of Johannesburg’s governance is the fiscal and governance crisis under which Mr Gordhan’s interventions were introduced. The interventions ushered in the fiscal stability that enabled a suite of subsequent developments that have enabled the city to better serve its public. The city’s internal efforts were fortuitously complemented by the roll-out of social grants across South Africa in 2000 that had a profound impact on poverty across the country, but particularly in cities, and enabled retail and mobility that partly off-set Johannesburg’s austerity (Meth, 2004; Bhorat and Kanbur, 2006).

2001-2006: South Africa’s Constitution recognized the need for autonomous local governments and handed local municipalities a raft of responsibilities (see Section 2). Under the system, political parties nominate Executive Mayors in each municipality, but residents are able to elect their local government of choice (MCDPA, 1998; MSA, 2000). The new legislation was informed by Johannesburg’s governance failure in 1998, and recognized the City of Johannesburg as one of six Metropolitan Municipalities respectively responsible for South Africa’s major cities.
Following South Africa’s local government elections in December 2000, Amos Masondo of the ANC was appointed Executive Mayor of the Johannesburg UniCity. This was the first time that Johannesburg’s governance architecture was not arranged along racial lines. The Masondo mayorship of the Johannesburg UniCity represented the political culmination of the institutional process that had begun in the late 1980s and been primed by Ketso Gordhan. For the first time Johannesburg had one tax base, a clear political mandate and the capacity to plan as one city given that each Executive Committee had an ANC majority. The city was able to draw on the State’s instruments, ordinances and budget to define and pursue a vision of urban development that has come to represent Johannesburg’s turn-around.

With the benefit of a small but expanding capital surplus, Amos Masondo set about ensuring that the agencies created by Ketso Gordhan became operational. He appointed a ‘Contracts Management Unit’ that reported directly to the City Manager and the Executive Mayor, and committed the City to a three-year rolling plan for cost-recovery, asset maintenance and financial prudence. Interest rates were falling globally and South Africa and Johannesburg’s renewed financial accountability enabled the City to borrow money at more affordable rates.

Coherent city management was enhanced by a December 2002 court ruling against opposition parties’ right to representation in strategic decisions in the Mayoral Committee. The ruling was supported by Masondo’s removal of all councillors, including those from the ANC, from the committees that approve development applications. This unprecedented move prevented pet-projects and constituency-specific interests trumping the City’s over-arching spatial logic (Todes, 2015). The result saw the demarcation of seven City Improvement District (CIDs) including Soweto, the inner-City, Newtown and Braamfontein.

A specific focus on Soweto saw services improve, an expansion of commercial opportunities and all streets in the suburb tarred. In the inner-city, deliberate efforts to upgrade derelict buildings were continued, crime prevention efforts were strengthened with closed-circuit television cameras and new office premises were created.

Late in 2002, the City of Johannesburg wrote a closeout report on the National Treasury intervention of 1998, effectively regaining autonomy over its budget. Capitalizing on this autonomy and the relative political unanimity, Masondo led a process of proactive planning that culminated in the city’s first long-term City Development Strategy – ‘Joburg 2030’ which outlined a vision for Johannesburg as a “World Class African City” (CoJ, 2002). The act of long-term planning marked an important shift for the city administration that had been in a reactive, crisis management mode and signalled a re-engagement with the local and global economy and the luxury of imagining a better future.
In December 2002, Johannesburg hosted leaders at the World Summit on Sustainable Development; an event that fostered allegiance within the Global South and showcased the unified city. The expanding imaginary of what Johannesburg might become was not always aligned to the city’s administrative performance. A call centre, ‘Joburg Connect’, was created.

Figure 3: Time of Johannesburg’s fiscal and institutional collapse and short-term turn-around (1995-2005)
in 2002 to improve interaction with the public. The centre received 176,000 calls in its first month, three quarters of which related to billing queries. In 2004 the City of Johannesburg re-entered the bond market for the first time since 1994 with two ZAR 1 billion bonds that were considerably over-subscribed.

The CIDs had begun a strategy of spatial prioritization, but could not prevent the rapid expansion of new informal settlements and the 'transmogrification' of the city into a polycentric urban form (Ahmed, 2010). This was in spite of the city tabling its first Spatial Development Framework and demarcating an "urban edge" in 2001 (Todes, 2015). The City itself was involved in the building of housing units in Cosmo City and Orange Farm, making it complicit in the urban sprawl as it scrambled to provide houses for the growing population. According to Ketso Gordhan, "Nobody fully costed the spatial planning and low cost housing decisions at the time, and [the decision to build low-cost houses at Orange Farm] has cost the State a fortune in transport subsidies not to mention social dislocation" (Gordhan, 2015, personal communications). The continued expansion of the mini-bus taxi industry at this time ameliorated the private impact of sprawl by allowing job-seekers to commute from remote new settlements. However, the public cost of extending sanitation, water and electricity services to these settlements comprised a fiscal burden.

2006-2011: By the time Amos Masondo began his second five-year term in 2006, service delivery and revenue collection was improving notably. The City's capital budget was over ZAR 3 billion (up from ZAR 295 million in 1999/2000) and both the national and the local economy were expanding. From a position of relative stability, the City of Johannesburg began a process of rapid implementation especially in the historically significant Soweto.

In 2008, 'Joburg 2030' was supported by the city's "Growth Management Strategy" (GMS). The GMS, championed by Herman Pienaar, recognized the problem of a sprawling urban footprint and sought to influence Johannesburg's spatial form via strategic fiscal allocations in public infrastructure (Todes, 2015) – a significant departure from the cartographic 'Master Planning' logic. This thinking, inspired by senior official visits to Bogota and Curitiba, initiated discussions on Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems and saw the emergence of Capital Investment Priority Areas (CIPAs) that later informed Johannesburg's Corridors of Freedom (Section 6).

The logic of the GMS received a legal boost when Johannesburg's challenge of the Gauteng Development Tribunal's approval of rezoning and development applications that the city felt imposed unaffordable service delivery obligations, was upheld in a 2010 Constitutional Court ruling. The ruling restored the power of local municipalities across South Africa to determine and align their spatial and fiscal planning.13

Planning for the 2010 World Cup expedited infrastructure construction, with an emphasis on public transport – the Gautrain14 (the rapid rail link between the airport and the Sandton) and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). The cost of World Cup preparations (inflated by private sector collusion), in conjunction with the unruly political transition that followed Thabo Mbeki's ousting as South Africa's president and the downturn in the global economy, saw a temporary contraction of the Johannesburg economy and budget mid-way through Masondo's second term. The contraction was exacerbated by a 'billing crisis' that ensued when the city sought to migrate its revenue collection system to the multinational software corporation Systems, Applications, Products (SAP) in 2010. Ironically, the migration was awarded 'Gold Status' by SAP itself, but resulted in lost accounts, incorrect bills and a haemorrhaging of hard-won confidence in the City. At its worst moment in October 2011, the city faced a backlog of 136,000 billing queries from its roughly 1 million account-paying residents, and the legacy of distrust and frustration in the City's billing capacity continues to this day (Grootes, 2016).

13 This restoration was frustrated by delays in the passing of the Spatial Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA) that was intended to replace the DFA and which only came into effect on 1 July 2015.
14 The Gautrain was not a local government project, but the areas around Gautrain stations received significant investments in infrastructure.
2011-2015: Executive Mayors in South Africa may only serve two 5-year terms. South Africa’s 2011 municipal elections marked the appointment of Parks Tau as Johannesburg’s new Executive Mayor. Tau was widely recognized as an intellectual, a visionary and a person to pose priorise the economy.

The new Executive Mayor continued with long-term planning in the form of a Growth and Development Strategy under the tagline “Joburg 2040 – a World Class African City of the Future. A vibrant, equitable African city, strengthened through its diversity; a city that provides real quality of life; a city that provides sustainability for all its citizens; a resilient and adaptive society” (CoJ, 2011).

Between 2009 and 2012 the City of Johannesburg’s budget increased 29 per cent in real terms and Mayor Tau established a commanding presence in South Africa and in the international community. He achieved this off the urban platform created between 1999 and 2011. His team of strategic advisors and senior officials is intent on leveraging the “agency of the state” - described as fiscal, legislative and convening influence. As one senior official put it, “The city finds itself in a sweet spot, where it enjoys political stability, a healthy capital budget and the confidence of the private sector. We want to use this opportunity.”

Under Mayor Tau the city has become an active member of the international Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40 Alliance), Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI), the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) network and Metropolis. Parks Tau’s emphasis on innovation has seen senior administrators take new responsibility for the budget and produce a raft of new initiatives, many of them targeting the city’s spatial form (Silimela, 2015, personal communication). Since the first bond issue in 2004, Johannesburg has made six subsequent issues including Africa’s first ZAR 1.46 billion ‘green bond’.

The most visual manifestation of Park Tau’s agency, however, has been the unlikely return of private sector investment to Braamfontein, Jeppestown, Maboneng, Hillbrow and Yeoville. With the support of the creative industries, private property developers and public investment, these once-blighted suburbs are seen as fashionable in the minds of students, middle-class socialites and business people (Gregory, 2015). A photo documentary of the changing Jeppestown CBD interface described the ‘bringing together of tsotsis and taverns with hipsters and professionals’ in a process of inner-city renewal, urban renewal and forging of new urban identities (Nicholson, 2013). The city’s “Derelict Building” programme, supported by investment from the Johannesburg Development Agency, has recruited pioneering property developers prepared to partner with the city. Ponte Towers, for example, once the symbol of Johannesburg’s decay, was purchased by property developers in 2007 and transformed into a sought-after business and residential address complete with biometric security access.

Adjacent to fashionable new galleries, nightspots and secure apartments, derelict buildings continue to exist and the inner-city renewal is a gentrification of sorts. Reflecting on the Derelict Building Programme that began in the late-1990s, Rubin (2014) accuses the city of “a clear, hegemonic urban vision of creating an orderly, neat and ‘modern’ inner city, which housed international capital and middle-class residents to the exclusion of poorer people.” Certainly efforts at inner-city renewal have created predictable ‘winners’ in the form of private property developers, and ‘losers’ in the displaced poor and evicted poor occupants unable to prove their rights to tenure. The forces are different, but the outcome for poor, tenure-insecure urban residents is remarkably similar to those under the apartheid-era forced removal. This default hints at the innate difficulties of the challenge confronting Johannesburg as it seeks to craft an urban renewal agenda while attracting the requisite investment, retaining rate-paying residents and ensuring economic competitiveness.

The city is not naïve to the gentrification threat but, although never explicitly stated, appears to perceive the negative side effects of urban upgrades as preferable to the slumlords, crime and disinvestment of the late 1990s inner-city of Johannesburg. Johannesburg’s officials

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15 This assessment is supported, especially for the political dimension, by Bénit-Gbaffou (2012).
16 Inner city apartment prices are estimated to have risen 45 percent between 2010 and 2013 (Muller, 2013).
are also mindful of the need to compete for investment and international attention with other African cities such as Lagos and Nairobi.

The Executive Mayor is quick to point out the 'vibrancy' of renewed inner-city locations; that Braamfontein and Maboneng are now places, “Where people can find themselves beyond the historic divides of the city… [They] represent the future we aspire to” (Tau, 2015). In his 2013 State of the City Address, Tau introduced the idea of “restitching our city to create a promising future”. It is under the ‘restitching’ metaphor that the city has combined the BRT system with the former CIPAs and CID’s to create the Corridors of Freedom spatial strategy and the Jozi@Work labour market intervention (see Section 5). The overlay of services and property upgrades in Johannesburg does finesse the conventional gentrification model based on property transactions, and the Executive Mayor is correct in suggesting that the urban identities emerging in newly upgraded precincts are original; while they draw on 'world class city' themes, neither the process nor the outcome is an imitation of European or even Latin American cities.

It remains to be seen whether Johannesburg’s renewal can enfranchise enough residents quickly enough to be sustainable, or whether it can be replicated in less central areas of the city. Certainly contradictions persist in Johannesburg. In 2013, the city undertook ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ in which 8,000 informal traders, many of them foreign migrants, were removed from their trading posts. The operation was declared illegal in December 2014 by the Constitutional Court, which accused the city of “humiliation and degradation”. The ruling exposed the innate difficulty in advancing the notion of a ‘world class African city’ that attracts investment and is pleasing to live in for a rate-paying urban elite, while simultaneously remaining inclusive, diverse and accessible to livelihood makers across the socio-economic spectrum. In Johannesburg, it is a difficulty that is amplified by the lack of capacity within corporate and cost-efficient service delivery agencies to engage and consult with what is loosely defined as ‘the community’.

There are related concerns that Mayor Tau’s approach is a distraction from the basic service delivery obligations of the municipality, and about the levels of debt being incurred in trying to crowd-in private sector investment into new precinct development during a stagnating market. The stridency of the Tau administration and its commitment to applying the agency of the State to influence the city’s development has seen it accused of being ‘top-down’ and of imposing sophisticated ideas on an unsophisticated bureaucracy. In 2014, Parks Tau launched a 'Back to Basics' campaign committing his staff to efficient basic service delivery while still pursuing extraordinary projects. The ‘basics’ included renewed efforts to ensure coherent governance, timely decisions on development applications, better service delivery and more effective billing. In spite of excluding Soweto’s energy debt the City of Johannesburg is still owed over ZAR 13 billion. The proportion of the budget spent on infrastructure maintenance and repairs will also increase from 4.8 percent in 2012/13 to 9.0 percent in 2015/16 (CoJ 2015b, p.9). Sceptics cast doubt on whether Johannesburg’s visionary leadership is capable of improving its day-to-day operational performance, but if nothing else the commitments indicate a sensitivity to public opinion.

Experienced bureaucrats in South Africa are clear that, in the midst of policy flux, budget allocation remains the best indication of a city’s actual priorities. Johannesburg’s capital budget allocation for 2015/16 supports the ‘Back to Basics’ narrative. Priority is given to electricity provision, housing, roads (via Johannesburg Roads Agency) and public transport. Much of this money will be spent by the respective agencies and focused in the precincts that constitute the Corridors of Freedom in a continuation of the 2006 commitment to align spatial planning and fiscal allocations (Todes, 2012).

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17 Tau is not the first to use the word ‘restitching’ in the urban context. In the past it has been applied to describe integration of nature and urban transport routes to the urban infrastructure.

18 Todes (2015) points out that the original Spatial Development Framework in 2001 spoke about corridor development, but that this development was futile until it had been supported by public investment in infrastructure.
This alignment of spatial and fiscal strategy resonates with the National Treasury’s new emphasis on Built Environment Performance Plans (BEPP) to force the Metros to be specific about their spatial priorities and which projects to prioritise with fiscal commitments. Johannesburg’s BEPP has provided a useful planning discipline, but one that has proven reasonably easy to adopt given the City’s commitment to spatial and budget alignment since 2006 (Todes, 2012).
4. Joburg 2015: turned-around metropolitan city?

The word ‘turn-around’ is now a regular feature of political speeches in Johannesburg. Undeniably, however, Johannesburg underwent a remarkable process of re-establishing itself financially and institutionally following the fiscal crisis of 1997/98. In the process it has redefined and regained its agency in the city-region. There is, inevitably for a large and complex city, more than one narrative on Johannesburg’s history and the turn-around (Grootes, 2016). Johannesburg’s transition has created winners and losers (Grant and Thompson, 2015). People interviewed in this study differed markedly in their interpretation of the forces that shaped the fiscal collapse and on the individuals, interventions and timeframes that defined the recovery. In terms of the technical
criteria identified in this project’s Framework Paper, the City of Johannesburg’s story between 1990 and 2015 accords neatly with the features of a 'turn-around'. The recovery may have been supported by the national progression post-democracy, but was in no way guaranteed. In a number of other post-industrial cities, the type of fiscal crisis experienced by Johannesburg in 1998 has precipitated extended periods of decline or depression.

It is worth revisiting the study methodology’s turn-around criteria individually in the context Johannesburg’s history outlined above.

4.1 A marked change in economic growth, as reflected in GDP, over a 5-10 year period. Between South Africa’s two censuses (1996 and 2011), the city’s Gross Value Add increased 87.7 percent (in real terms) and economic growth has consistently been above the national average (Harrison et al., 2015). Mean per capita GDP has increased too, and is the highest of any South African city at ZAR 104,666. Eleven percent of people in Johannesburg run their own business, but 78 percent of black business owners are in the informal sector (Gotz et al., 2015). 18 percent of Johannesburg residents said they were in debt that they could not afford in 2011. While private debt has increased, the city’s debt:revenue ratio has actually declined marginally over the past three years to 42.1 percent and the city’s operating margins are stable at around 12 percent.

Perhaps one of the best indications of Johannesburg’s economic success is that work seekers have chosen to move to the city (Crush, 2008). In 1996, 10.3 percent of the national working population lived in the city but by 2011 this had increased to 12.8 percent. The moderate declines in poverty, in spite of rapid urbanisation, have been assisted by a post-2000 roll out of social grants across South Africa. But the Johannesburg economy itself has proven capable of harnessing the upward mobility generated by these grants, and employment and growth in the retail and services sector.

4.2 An expansion of public investment with a deliberate focus on infrastructure that enhances productivity and inclusivity.

The City of Johannesburg’s budget has grown from ZAR 309 million just after the fiscal crisis in 1998/1999, to ZAR 52.6 billion in 2015/2016. The budget allocated to capital projects, which was stripped to zero in the crisis, has grown from ZAR 295 million in 1999/2000 to ZAR 11.4 billion in 2015/16. This is in spite of a fiscal tightening after the rapid expenditure in the build up to the 2010 Soccer World Cup (Figure 6). In 2014, 41.2 percent of this capital budget was funded through cash reserves.

Figure 6: City of Johannesburg capital budget select years between 1999-2015 (ZAR billion)

Source: CoJ 2015b
The service infrastructure roll-out has not undermined Johannesburg’s forward cover in terms of cash reserves. This cover stood at 31 days in 2014. The city’s capacity to spend this money has improved proportionately and Johannesburg’s public infrastructure has enhanced service delivery, even if not always keeping pace with demand or meeting ratepayers’ approval (Table 2).

Data available suggests that service delivery has continued to improve, but also left conspicuous deficits. The number of people with 'access' to improved water (within 50m of a stand-pipe) increased from 90.8 percent in 2011 to 95.8 percent in 2014, but 30,000 Johannesburg residents still walked over 200 metres to access water. Improved in-house sanitation was available to 95 percent of the population in 2014, but of the 70,000 households without this service 14,500 households continued to rely on the demeaning 'bucket toilet' system (CoJ, 2014; Everatt, 2015). The service delivery improvements made by Johannesburg since 2000 are similar to those made in South Africa’s other progressive cities – Durban and Cape Town; although neither Durban nor Cape Town were simultaneously recovering from the same fiscal collapse.

Table 2: Improving service delivery and development in Johannesburg 2001-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Households</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>1,050,299</td>
<td>1,434,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piped water in home</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reticulated sewerage in home</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>94.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity access</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse removal</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of population with 'Matric' school leaving qualification</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of population with no schooling</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census, 2011, BEPP, 2014

In spite of new housing developments, the percentage of Johannesburg’s population living in informal settlements has remained constant between 2001 and 2011 at just under 8 percent. Twenty-two percent of Black Africans live in informal dwellings showing that certain aspects of the apartheid society remain unreformed. As Everatt points out, given the rate of population growth (in the Gauteng Province) and the adopted obligation of the democratically elected government to provide “an entire package of social support interventions” itself, some deficits are inevitable (Everatt, 2015, p.66).

4.3 Fast-tracked projects. Flagship initiatives that enjoy high levels of political support and are designed to send a message to investors regarding the location of opportunity.

Johannesburg’s turn-around has been marked by a number of emblematic projects, especially as the capital budget has increased. Two specific projects, the Corridors of Freedom and Jozi@Work are described in Section 5.

The tarring of roads in, and extension of services to, Soweto was a significant part of the incorporation of Soweto in the UniCity. Soweto changed from a dormitory town in 1994 with just 60,000m² of retail space to a fully-fledged suburb in 2014 with over 220,000m² of commercial property in 2014 (CoJ, 2014). Deliberate urban renewal programmes have also made a visible impact on Braamfontein, Klip town, Alexandria, Jeppiestown, Hillbrow and Maboneng by attracting rate-paying residents and businesses back into these areas and targeting 'problem buildings'.

Ponte Tower, Soccer City, the Gautrain stations, the BRT lanes and buses, Cosmo City housing project and the New Town Precinct – including the Nelson Mandela Bridge that links two previously segregated parts of the city – are among the visible reminders of the city’s influence on the 'changing space, changing city' (Harrison et al., 2015). These efforts have been supported by a suite of 'softer' programmes including a commitment to develop the green economy, City Power’s roll-out of over 43,000 solar water heaters, the fixing of water leaks, a
public call centre, an increasing presence in the global bond market and an eco-mobility festival. Although there are analogous programmes and projects in South Africa’s other major cities, their abundance and strategic intent in Johannesburg is testimony to the city’s growing agency and innovation.

4.4 A visible, and publicly acknowledged policy and institutional commitment to effective urban management.

The City of Johannesburg’s efforts to fulfil its constitutional mandate are on-going. The improvement of governance is reflected in a range of service delivery indicators. The annual budget report is now a public engagement exercise, and performance relative to intuitive ‘targets’ has become the norm, for example:

- ‘Cash coverage’ for which the target is 45 days fell from 65 days in 2013 to 31 days in 2014.
- ‘Interest payments relative to expenditure’ at 7 percent is currently at 4 percent.
- ‘Proportion of budget spent on salaries’ is currently at 33 percent against a target of 30 percent.

The Executive Mayors since 2001 have succeeded in insulating the city from the ructions that afflict the National Government and have resisted the gratuitous institutionalisation of patronage and corruption that has been a feature of government elsewhere in South Africa (Grootes, 2016)\(^{19}\). They have both led efforts to engage and win the confidence of the public and the business community, but have accepted the right of citizens and the independent media to express discontent (Friedman, 2009; Bénit-Gbaffou and Katsaura, 2014).

The increase in service delivery protests within the city’s boundaries has been modest in comparison to the Gauteng Province as a whole, but the concentration of protests in Soweto and Alexandra speak to the difficulties experienced in redressing apartheid’s spatial economy (Figure 7). The city does not yet have the capacity to enable community-led action, and law enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to manage urban protests without resorting to brutality and this is openly acknowledged amongst senior officials.

In 2011 a quality of life survey that interviewed 17,000 people in the Gauteng Province revealed that 71 percent of respondents were ‘satisfied with their lives as a whole’. It also, however, highlighted common grievances including the billing system, the high cost of services, potholes, subsidence due to mining activity, electricity outages and delayed planning approvals. Over half of Johannesburg’s residents (53%) surveyed in the Quality of Life study were dissatisfied with their level of safety.

Billing and debt collection is a problem for both citizens and the city. Without revenue collection it is very difficult to affect the spatial transformation and development that is central to the City’s plans. The local government has been criticised for its focus on technocratic cost-recovery and for pandering to the suburban middle-class (Beall et al., 2002; Didier et al., 2013), but senior officials see this as necessary for generating a capital surplus and sustaining fiscal investment in urban development and spatial reform. As in other South African cities, water is the most difficult municipal service to account for in Johannesburg. Half of the 650,000 people or entities using the City of Johannesburg’s water (amounts to 230,000 megalitres) are reported not to be on the billing system (Molatlhwa, 2015).

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\(^{19}\) Jeremy Cronin, a Communist Party Deputy Minister in Jacob Zuma’s cabinet, captured the contradictions held by the national government (and largely avoided by Johannesburg) as follows, [It] depends upon: the ANC and alliance for electoral reproduction but which seeks to hollow-out the movement at the same time; the problematic and corrupt-prone relationship between the new political elite and emerging and established capital (business); the schizophrenic balancing act inherent in a project that presents itself simultaneously as ‘westernising/modernising’ on the one hand, and Africanist on the other; and related to the above, the over-burdening and excessive personalisation of the presidential political centre…"
4.6 An effort at brand building and desire for international recognition.

At the height of the fiscal crisis, Johannesburg was internationally infamous as an unsafe city. Since that time, respective leaders have pursued a more hospitable urban identity with phrases such as 'most inclusive city', 'World Class African City', 'City of Migrants' and a 'City at Work', but perceptions of crime persist and have been underscored by recent xenophobic attacks (Rogerson, 1996, p. 143; Didier et al., 2013; Rubin, 2014).

The City’s International Relations office has been deliberate in establishing the Executive Mayor in global city networks such as C40, ICLEI, Habitat, UCLG and Metropolis. Mr Tau's leadership and charisma have ensured he, and by association Johannesburg, have gained international profile and respect through these networks. In 2015 Johannesburg hosted both the month-long Eco-Mobility Festival (that encouraged pedestrianisation, bicycling and the use of public transport) and the annual Metropolis event.
The Executive Mayor has also been deliberate in his quest for new urban identities, framing his strategies in emotive language (e.g. ‘Corridors of Freedom’) and capturing the imagination of citizens. The confluence of down-town, hipster and student cultures in newly upgraded urban precincts is not easily dismissed in terms of South Africa’s historical racial divides. It offers the hope of a new Johannesburg urban identity that transcends old categories.

Inevitably the line between proactive leadership and hubris remains fine for an ambitious developmental state. The technocratic ‘developmental-state’ ethos that has prevailed in Johannesburg since the early 1990s, has yet to find ways of harnessing community-based organisations effectively or of devolving control and responsibility in the process (Rubin, 2007; Adegun, 2015). On the contrary, the increasing stridency of government-led projects and programmes has at times alienated certain citizens and potential collaborators (Rubin, 2014). In the process it has failed to engage important sources of 'hidden' and 'invisible power' in the city's business sector, affluent suburbs, cultural leaders and informal settlements to the detriment of its own agency. Places of worship, student movements, community interest groups and charismatic local leaders may be a more reliable source of brand identity for Johannesburg citizenry.

Interestingly, one of Johannesburg’s most effective brand transitions involved the increasing use of the word, 'Jozi' to describe Johannesburg, and was not instigated by government but has been used by the city. The word resonates with the four major languages spoken in Johannesburg – Sesotho, isiZulu, Afrikaans and English – and transcends race and class divides to evoke a sense of place, belonging, familiarity and post-modern sophistication. This identity has found expression in the renewal of places such as Jeppestown and Braamfontein, which the Executive Mayor believes embody what Johannesburg could become (Tau, 2015). It is too early to tell whether the sophisticated veneer of these places will endure against a backdrop of poverty and inequality, but in the short-term the change is apparent.

Equally, it is not yet clear that the city has tackled its deeper psycho-social “anomie” (Everatt, 2015, p.69). The eruption of xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 bears testimony to the propensity for the city’s violent and brutal history to replicate itself regardless of formal government regimes. During two weeks in 2008, more than 100,000 foreign-born residents were displaced, over 60 people were killed and property valued at millions of rand was looted (Landau, 2010).
Similarly, the City of Johannesburg strategy documents are conspicuously silent on gender violence and redress of patriarchal systems both within the economy and within society. This is in spite of ANC policy being clear on gender (and other) discrimination, and very different experiences between men and women of unequal access to services, structural exclusion from work opportunities and access, and safety in public spaces (Taylor, 2011).

5. Flagships
Further insight into Johannesburg’s turn-around is gained by examining two of the extraordinary projects undertaken by the City once the capital budget had been restored:

i. The Corridors of Freedom that aim to connect people and places in new ways through high-density precinct developments and efficient public transport.

ii. Jozi@Work programme that uses the City’s budget to generate work for people that have been marginalised by the capital intensity of South Africa’s economy and the structural nature of South Africa’s unemployment.

They are extraordinary projects in the sense that they extend beyond the legally mandated responsibilities of Metropolitan Local Governments in South Africa. The projects are only possible due to the fiscal and governance capacity that Johannesburg gained after 1998. Importantly, they demonstrate a deep and sophisticated understanding of Johannesburg’s underlying structural impediments and a commitment to tackle these that surpasses efforts in South Africa’s other Metros. They are testimony to the current city administration’s efforts to “build stepping stones to …2040” (Tau, 2015).

5.1 Corridors of Freedom
For the City of Johannesburg, and its ANC leadership, the replication of apartheid divides is an ideological affront. As Johnny Steinberg points out in the broader South African context, "A party promising jobs [now] wards off mass hunger by giving cash transfers to nearly 17 million people every month. A movement whose flagship idea was reconciliation has watched friendship between black and white all but disappear" (Steinberg, 2015). Apartheid’s obdurate spatial legacy has become an existential challenge (Visser and Rogerson, 2014). In Johannesburg the poorest areas continue to be on the urban periphery; those where Black communities were forced to live prior to 1991, or where newly urbanized Black citizens can afford to settle (Soweto, Alexandra, Orange Farm, Diepsloot, Ivory Park) under a property regime that is inherently influenced by the finance sector (Rubin, 2014). As a result, 16.4 percent of Gauteng residents spend one fifth or more of their income on transport and the average one-way commute for people living in Johannesburg was 54 minutes (Erasmus, 2013). The same increasingly remote settlements have inflated the cost of service delivery and stretched fiscal resources.

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20 Members of the ANC have a duty to, “Fight against racism, tribal chauvinism, sexism, religious and political intolerance or any other form of discrimination or chauvinism” (ANC, 2015).
The Corridors of Freedom, announced by Parks Tau in the State of the City address (2013) built on the effort that began in 2006 to align Johannesburg's spatial planning and investment in public infrastructure (Todes, 2012). The aim of “re-stitching our city to create a better future” (Tau, 2013) is pursued through demarcated zones in which strategic public investment is concentrated in an effort to “crowd-in” private investment. The intention is to prevent the default of private sector investment simply replicating Johannesburg’s problematic urban form, and instead to crowd this investment into a compact and coherent urban centre. Significantly, the approach is not exclusively focused on property and buildings and instead includes the provision of services, mobility, work (in concert with Jozi@Work) and upholds the social goal of inclusion in the hope that this will ameliorate the regressive forces of gentrification. By creating new public spaces and enhancing mobility within the city, the hope is “to create the feeling that you belong to the city regardless of race, colour or creed or even nationality” (Tau, 2015).

Eight corridors were initially proposed, but four are currently under construction: Soweto, Empire-Perth linking Soweto to the CBD, Louis Botha Corridor linking the CBD to Alexandra and Sandton, and the Turffontein Node that is close to the CBD and serviced by the existing Metrobus and rail link. A Mining Belt corridor will complete its planning in the 2015/16 financial year. Three further corridors, Randburg to OR Tambo Airport, Randburg to Diepsloot and Lanseria Airport, and the Mining Belt Alex to Ivory Park are planned for completion before 2040.

The corridors adopt the logic of Transit Oriented Development and seek to realize the fiscal efficiencies that arise through agglomeration effects, make a “clean break with apartheid spatial distribution” and connect people living on the urban periphery with economic opportunities in the central city (CoJ, 2013). Fundamentally they recognize that space in a city cannot be treated equally. The corridors are deliberate in linking economic hubs with the city’s poorer communities.
It is estimated that this strategy will require ZAR 100 billion over ten years which, while ambitious, is plausible if the capital budget continues to increase. Certainly the budget is commensurate with the scale of the problem; preceding piecemeal attempts to overcome apartheid's spatial legacy in Johannesburg (and South Africa) have proven unsuccessful.

The key public investment involves the BRT, but the corridors aim to complement the capital outlay of the BRT with road upgrades, the release of land for development, building improvements, the building of schools and other amenities. The hope is to render the BRT more viable in the process. Since the first BRT trunk route was rushed into operation in August 2009 linking Ellis Park, Doornfontein and Thokoza Park in Soweto ahead of the Soccer World Cup, more thought has been given to subsequent phases. Phase 1A and 1B (Thokoza Park to Parktown route, as well as the feeders and complementary services to and from Cresta, Yeoville, Parktown, Pimville, Dobsonville and Mapetla) are now complete. The two phases have already cost over ZAR 3 billion and required 277 buses, dedicated stations and purpose-built lanes. The long-term vision is to place 85 percent of Johannesburg's population within 500 metres of a Rea Vaya station, but initial uptake has been slow. Phase 1A was intended to carry 43,000 passengers a day and reach a total of 532,000 people (5 percent of Johannesburg's population). As of June 2015 it was transporting 38,000, but passenger numbers are increasing slowly. Phase 1B is planned to transport 50,000 passengers a day.

Given that the BRT has cost the City roughly 10 percent of its capital budget, ensuring that this sunk cost generates sufficient revenue requires greater use of the buses and some recouping of the stimulus that the system has provided to the adjacent property. The hope is that the corridors will encourage high population densities along the BRT routes (Erasmus, 2013).21

21 Jan Erasmus presentation
The Joburg Property Company (JPC, one of the agencies established by Ketso Gordhan) owns a property portfolio of ZAR 8.6 billion, and the intention is to leverage this portfolio for developmental gains within the corridors. Each corridor is supported by a 'Strategic Area Framework' that defines the budget, infrastructure requirements, incentives for the private sector, the land acquisition requirements, the densification target, and the priority precincts (i.e. the nodes that need to be developed within the corridor). The desired outcome will include mixed-use developments with convenient public transport and high levels of pedestrianisation that, in turn, stimulate retail hubs.

Public investment in the corridors is based on the perceived need for strategic infrastructure. In the inner-city and Turffontein, the focus is on housing and transport in an attempt to increase use of the existing bus and rail services. In the Empire-Perth Corridor the critical need is perceived to be electricity and over ZAR 100 million is being channelled through City Power. In the Louis Botha corridor, the city has been able to make quick progress and the considerable budget allocated to JPC is being used to buy up the land required to build public infrastructure. It remains to be seen whether the corridors can create enough affordable housing while being financially viable.

The greatest challenge to the internal logic of the Corridors of Freedom, however, involves the 'mega-habitat' programme run by the Gauteng Province that has endorsed new towns located near the urban edge in the latest manifestation of long-running tensions between local and provincial housing plans. If developed, the new towns will detract fiscal resources from the corridors and threaten their viability.

Figure 11: The Louis Botha corridor showing priority precincts
Not everyone is convinced that the Corridors of Freedom will realise a virtuous cycle of mobility and inclusive development. While interested, most property developers and investors interviewed as part of this research were adopting a 'wait and see' approach, and some expressed concerns that the ambitious plan was not supported by the basics of successful property development such as power guarantees, water provision and timely approval of development applications by the City of Johannesburg. There are also concerns that in seeking to crowd-in private sector investment to designated development corridors, the City will distort the market and waste money, especially as the property market slows down. There is a danger that if a project is within the corridor it will be considered 'good' regardless of its cost, benefits and intrinsic merits and as such the corridors will encourage poor investment decisions. In order to counter rent-seeking, the Johannesburg Development Agency appointed a Development Facilitation Unit to undertake 'strategic bargaining' on behalf of the city and the public good in “defining the vision, getting people on board, activating fair benefits and cost-sharing partnerships, ensuring impact and creating public enthusiasm through area marketing” (Lewis, 2015, personal communication).

The government has voiced concern that very little of South Africa’s ZAR 6.5 trillion worth of private savings (ZAR 4 trillion of which is long-term pension money) has been invested in social infrastructure or in the country’s economic transition. This has seen renewed calls for a statutory prescription to buy government bonds. The private sector has opposed the intervention, but fund managers are under pressure to diversify their investment portfolios. Johannesburg’s Corridors of Freedom have the potential to provide precisely the type of public-private partnership that could obviate this pressure, in which case they might easily attract funding.

Paul Mashatile (Chairman of the ANC in Gauteng Province) has been outspoken in articulating the reasons why pension money should be invested in social projects and in reducing South Africa’s inequality (Mashatile, 2015). The Government Employees Pension Fund, which holds ZAR 1.5 trillion of the country’s savings, has indicated its commitment to social infrastructure. This could well involve investing in exactly the types of projects that are
likely to emerge in the corridors. Such a move has been enabled by a relaxing of South Africa’s pension fund legislation that has increased the proportion of pension fund money that can be invested in non-listed assets from 5 percent to 35 percent.

Figure 13: Location of provincially approved housing developments (blue circles) and work opportunities/business (in red) showing the dispersed nature of the approved housing settlements that will undermine the City of Johannesburg’s efforts to enhance population density along BRT routes and in the Corridors of Freedom

5.2 Jozi@Work
The Jozi@Work programme, which was announced in 2014, deploys the city’s budget to tackle the structural underpinnings of Johannesburg’s 25 percent unemployment rate and significantly higher youth unemployment. The programme is run out of the Executive Mayor’s office and is a direct expression of Parks Tau’s desire to see the State as ‘developmental’ and as a ‘change agent’ rather than exclusively bureaucratic (Koseff, 2015, personal communications).

The labour market intervention creates ways for micro-enterprises to deliver municipal services. The understanding is that it is these micro-enterprises that are most labour intensive and which usually offer unemployed people their first job. The city has circumvented the need to employ individuals or micro-enterprises directly by contracting ‘Capabilities Support Agents’ (CSAs) through conventional procurement channels. CSAs are appointed within a particular sector to become responsible for contracting and managing workers. As of August 2015, 231 CSA applications had been received and five appointments had been made. The appointed CSAs are established firms with considerable management capacity, for example Aveng-Grinacker in the construction sector and Avis in the transport sector.

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22 Johannesburg has been reluctant to enter into service delivery contracts with individuals for legal reasons. The administration burden aside, it is very difficult for the city to manage expectations and to terminate such contracts when necessary.
To assist CSAs to employ labour intensive micro-enterprises and community-based co-operatives, the city has visited wards and registered willing enterprises. Applicants are ranked by the city in terms of their skills, their capacity to create work and local opportunities, their location (to ensure local work is done by local people), their community engagement and whether or not members receive social grants. Priority is given to people receiving social grants in an attempt to break grant dependency, and because grant beneficiaries tend to be registered on other databases and are more traceable.

Based on the City's recorded need for services in each ward, Jozi@Work contracts a CSA and recommends employees and micro-enterprises for sub-contraction. CSAs have the right to reject the Jozi@Work’s nominees but tend not to as these sub-contractors have come through the City's own screening process. The requirement is that 100 percent of the on-the-ground work must be done by sub-contractors and that the entire fee paid for the service be transferred to the sub-contracted micro-enterprises. The CSA is ultimately responsible for the quality of the service delivered and for human resource management, and is entitled to 7-15 percent management fee that is paid separately. Crucially, CSAs qualify for Black Economic Empowerment points based on their involvement in the programme, thereby addressing a major compliance concern for many South African corporates.

The Jozi@Work programme is new but on-going. The aim is to spend a third of the City’s contracting budget in this way (ZAR 3.2 billion in 2015/16 and ZAR 3.6 billion in 2016/17) and to create 40,000 jobs by the end of 2016. In its first year, the programme has only managed to spend ZAR 200 million (2 percent of the contracting budget) and create 2,000 jobs. The jobs that were created were 20 percent more expensive than the target rate, but considerably cheaper than those in South Africa’s other public works programmes.

Adversaries complain that Jozi@Work has been 'parachuted in from the Mayor's Office'. The city's own agencies have been amongst the most vocal critics pointing to a mis-alignment between Jozi@Work and existing initiatives. The Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), for example, supported a community-based organization called WASSUP Diepsloot in repairing community toilets in Diepsloot’s reception area. At the JDA’s request, WASSUP Diepsloot went to lengths to comply with non-profit organisation regulations, but as a result was considered too large to qualify as a micro-enterprise and too small to serve as a CSA. The organisation closed down in mid-2015 after failing to get Jozi@Work to support their historical role in the community. Pikitup, the City’s waste management agency, confronted similar problems but are currently negotiating with the Jozi@Work programme to register CSAs.

People responsible for Jozi@Work acknowledge the difficulties and the slow start, but appear committed to learn lessons and progress. Top-down as it may be, Jozi@Work has been designed to avoid the pitfalls of South Africa’s public works schemes. The long-standing problem of local elites and patronage, for example, is mitigated in Jozi@Work by the City’s role in mediating the relationship between CSAs and micro-enterprises and by the effort taken to enlist and objectively rank micro-enterprises.

Where successful, Jozi@Work will not only provide employment, municipal service extension, social inclusion and a sense of place, but it may in time induce cost savings and higher economic multipliers on the City’s budget allocation. This is particularly the case if CSAs and micro-enterprises are given some discretion as to how to comply with service quality standards. As such Jozi@Work could create a precedent for the rest of the country (and continent) in terms of the local government’s role in tackling structural unemployment and in providing inclusive urban services in the context of rapid urbanization, informality and an urban ‘youth bulge’.

The programme reflects bold leadership that understands the nature of social and economic problems such as unemployment and is committed to resolving them, even if this requires innovation, experimentation, some risk and additional budget.
6. **Conclusion – reflections on Johannesburg’s turn-around**

The combination of fiscal and institutional collapse experienced in Johannesburg in 1998 was profound. In many other cities it would have caused an extended period of capital flight, depression and under-development. Johannesburg turned its prospects around remarkably quickly given the extent of the crisis. Even more remarkably, this recovery has been sustained and accelerated, and has remained focused on deep structural problems and social integration at a time when the ANC at national level is retreating to traditional strongholds in the rural areas and a racially divisive political narrative.

The fact that Johannesburg’s turn-around is not widely acknowledged appears to reflect the assumption that it was inevitable. This is not the case, but can be explained in terms of the technocratic approach to addressing the problems at the time of the crisis. In 1998, the country was emerging from its own embattled period leading up to 1994 and held a sense that it had escaped a full-blown civil war. Johannesburg had been at the forefront of national reconciliation and subsequent devolution of power to local authorities. That the city’s early efforts to find a suitable governance and fiscal model failed seemed almost inevitable; an acceptable part of the experiment and process that characterised South Africa’s governance experiments post-1994. The nascent inter-governmental systems that were later formalised in South Africa’s three spheres of government worked in the wake of Johannesburg’s crisis. Not only did they prevent the fiscal crisis becoming an extended catastrophe, but they propelled the city forward.

The story of Johannesburg’s turn-around reflects, too, the progressive formation of local government in South Africa. The burden of responsibilities cast on South Africa’s local governments post-1994 was onerous to the point of being naïve considering that most of the country’s most able civil servants and political leaders were drawn into National Government. All municipalities in South Africa spent their early years grappling with basic functions such as budgets, organograms, rates collection and monitoring service delivery obligations. In this sense Johannesburg’s turn-around benefitted from a more general progression in which South Africa’s local authorities established themselves, gained a degree of agency and began tackling the challenges identified in the RDP with increasing skill and fiscal resources. That Johannesburg’s fortunes have been influenced by South Africa’s shift to democracy and the progressive realisation of capacitated Metropolitan Municipalities in South Africa should not be allowed to conceal the Johannesburg specific story, or the lessons that can be gleaned from it. These include:

- **The role of leadership.** Johannesburg is fortunate to have had a cohort of excellent and bold technocrats and politicians, most obviously Ketso Gordhan, Amos Masondo and Parks Tau; but also the teams of people that these leaders convened and their allies in the ANC, National Treasury and business. Leadership continuity was inspired by the national vision of democracy, non-racism and economic integration that Johannesburg had been instrumental in inserting into the ANC’s negotiations prior to 1994. Critically, successive Johannesburg leaders have avoided the institutionalisation of narrow patronage that has afflicted other South African and African cities (Grootes, 2016).

- **The importance of a supportive national framework.** South Africa’s devolution of power was sincere even while withholding responsibility for certain key portfolios. This devolution supported the City during the crisis but has not impeded the subsequent independence of the city as it has grown in authority and in budget. Contradictions between the provincial housing strategy and the Corridors of Freedom exist, but over the period of this study there is no sense that National or Provincial government was politically threatened by Johannesburg. Rather the national policy discourse was informed by experiences in Johannesburg, and was supportive during the crisis.

- **The importance of a consolidated Metropolitan Authority, with a single tax base, proved essential to Johannesburg.** It was only when Johannesburg was able to draw on the full tax base and imagine a city-wide spatial strategy that it was able to align spatial and fiscal planning in support of cross-subsidisation and progressive
governance. Even with this alignment, it has proven difficult to contrive a fiscal model that meets the need without over-extending the budget.

- **Engagement with global conversations, including climate change, sustainability and metropolitan governance.** After a short-period of 'lock-down' in 1999, the city was quick to re-engage with its own citizens and global networks, preventing it from becoming insulated or self-serving in its decision making.

- **Johannesburg has benefitted from a strong economy and a reasonable fiscal base.** Crucially, the city has used its fiscal base to engage the private sector. Should the Corridors of Freedom and Jozi@Work tackle the challenge of 'crowding-in' private sector investment to programmes that enhance the public good, Johannesburg will set critical precedents for the rest of the country (as it did in the institutional transition towards Metropolitan Municipalities); precedents that are at the heart of South Africa’s economic transition.

- **The singling out and branding of the spatial challenge in the 'Corridors of Freedom' programme is unprecedented in South Africa's other cities.** That Johannesburg has chosen to direct its new-found budget prowess at this problem is significant; it represents an understanding of South Africa’s urban problems and a strategic insight that is particular to Johannesburg. This strategy is both a symptom and a cause of the city’s turn-around. A ‘symptom’ in that tackling apartheid’s spatial legacy with a deliberate intervention requires a confident and well-capacitated local authority committed to the long term as envisioned in the 1994 RDP. It also requires a considerable capital budget (ZAR 100 billion over ten years), and the ability to risk this budget in order to affect social change. Johannesburg is the only Metropolitan Municipality in South Africa that has approved a three year capital budget, and much of this money will be directed towards infrastructure precincts in the corridors. The corridors are both a beneficiary and a cause of budget progress in that a more coherent urban form has yielded fiscal efficiencies in service delivery and underpinned private sector growth and access to labour markets for people located on the urban periphery (Todes, 2012). It also represents a commitment to making the existing investment in public transport more viable.

This is not to suggest that Johannesburg’s development is complete. Johannesburg is a diverse and complex city at the heart of South Africa’s new democracy; there is no uniform experience of citizenship for Johannesburg residents (Grant and Thompson, 2015). Race-based economic inequality, xenophobia and gender discrimination and violence (including in new urban public spaces) are a reminder that fiscal and political stability are necessary but insufficient for addressing deep-rooted social ills and creating an inclusive and just city (Landau, 2010; Taylor, 2011; Grant and Thompson, 2015). The suggestion that urban renewal efforts in Jeppestown and Braamfontein might default to a form of gentrification highlights the innate tensions between urban regeneration and inclusion of the poor in an economy in which private capital is influential. Certainly it is not clear that the constant flux within Johannesburg always supports the types of upward mobility that transforms “many poor people into middle-class people” as suggested by Jane Jacobs (Jacobs, 1961), rather than simply entrenching the urban elite.

The Corridors of Freedom and Jozi@Work programmes are deliberate in their attempt to reform Johannesburg’s problematic legacies, and are significantly more ambitious than any other in South Africa. In a city where the influence of local government’s land administration and fiscal strategy is at best partial, these programmes will always confront challenges. Success may rest on the ability of the city to sustain the fiscal injection long enough to entice private capital and ensure permanent spatial and labour market change. This, in turn, is contingent upon a fiscal model that can sustain the competitive economy required to finance the reform of the city’s infrastructure, services and space, while preventing the economy from replicating the spatial and social inequalities that undermine the city’s coherence and

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23 Amos Masondo was clear, in Joburg 2030, that redressing Johannesburg’s spatial form would take at least twenty years.
inclusivity. Without this model Johannesburg's turn-around might be superficial, a veneer that masks the entrenchment of pre-existing fault lines.

It is not yet clear that the City’s agency exercised in the Corridors of Freedom and Jozi@Work programmes can accommodate a fiscal or governance solution that does not depend entirely on the State’s efforts as a monopolistic service provider (Harrison et al., 2008; Winkler, 2011). It is this problem that underpins on-going criticism with regards to service delivery backlogs and infrastructure deficits (Adegun, 2015). It is, ironically, a role that the City of Johannesburg has willingly adopted, but which exposes it to rent seeking from private capital and risks alienating civil society. More importantly, it is a model of urbanism that is fiscally untenable in the context of the wide (and potentially never-ending) remit of local government responsibilities in South Africa (Everatt, 2015).

Where the Corridors of Freedom and Jozi@Work programmes are able to build on the City’s fiscal turn-around to reconfigure the relationship between people, space, capital and opportunity, Johannesburg will have once again generated important lessons and precedents for South Africa’s urban policy. This is only likely, however, if the programmes recognise the limits of the ‘developmental state’ and draw on the “vitality and multiplicity of actual service delivery systems” (Jaglin, 2015) so as to avoid reverting, through fiscal necessity and fear of urban decay, to a model of state-driven urban renewal that ultimately marginalises poor people. Where these programmes succeed in their aim of avoiding classic gentrification and reconfiguring the relationship between people, space, capital and opportunity, Johannesburg will have adapted a mode of urban governance that served it well in dismantling apartheid in the late 1980s (Mangcu, 2003).
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Annex A: Methodology for the study of 'turn-around cities'

There is a wealth of literature on Johannesburg since the 1970s and the research had to be selective in what it reviewed. Attention was given to the macro-economic data contained in annual budgets and economic reports as proxies for systemic changes in strategy, institutions and leadership. The city has produced a Spatial Development Framework and the more recent Built Environment Performance Plan (BEPP). Together with the Integrated Development Plan, which is updated annually, these documents provide a useful record of the city’s achievements and aspirations.

Demographic data are based on South Africa’s 2001 and 2011 Censuses, but are updated annually by each of the Metropolitan Municipalities in order to inform their budget allocations and investment plans. The city’s Executive Mayor delivers an annual “State of the City Address” that provides a useful time series of the political economy and associated priorities.

A volume of peer-reviewed literature has been produced by academics at the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS) and The University of Johannesburg, as well as by associated research units such as the Institute of Development Studies at the London School of Economics, the Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation in Johannesburg and the South African Cities Network (SACN).24 In addition to a dedicated research collaboration, the Gauteng City Regional Observatory (GCRO) between the two local universities and the Gauteng Province collects, analyses and maps a variety of regional economic and social data in an attempt to lend academic rigour to policy formation. In documenting city-region trends, the GCRO was not only valuable to this study, but has undeniably assisted in guiding the decisions that informed Johannesburg’s turn-around.

A series of interviews was conducted with senior management in the City of Johannesburg, resident academics, former civil servants, NGO leaders and business executives. Interviewees were sent a list of questions in advance, but actual interviews were semi-structured and conversational. Certain interviews were recorded, and notes were taken in all interviews. Where requested, opinions and data collected in the interviews have not been attributed. The full list of interviews is included in Table 3.

24 Alison Todes, Philip Harrison and Graeme Gotz are among a group of academics that have produced valuable literature on Johannesburg. Changing space, changing city: Johannesburg after Apartheid (edited by Harrison, Gotz, Todes and Wray) is the latest in this literature, but it draws on earlier work by Richard Tomlinson, Robert Beauregard, Lindsay Bremner and Xolela Mangcu, Susan Parnell and Owen Crankshaw.
Table 3: List of interviewees in this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graeme Gotz</td>
<td>Research Director, Gauteng City Regional Observatory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christine Culwick</td>
<td>Researcher, Gauteng City Regional Observatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Ballard</td>
<td>Researcher, Gauteng City Regional Observatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jak Koseff</td>
<td>City of Johannesburg, Office of the Executive Mayor - Jozi@Work and Economic Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Philip Harrison</td>
<td>South African Research Chair in Development Planning and Modeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharon Lewis</td>
<td>City of Johannesburg - Executive Manager for Planning and Strategy (until early 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEPP Review Team (National Treasury)</td>
<td>The review team comprises senior Treasury officials and technical assistants and is responsible for providing feedback on the Built Environment Performance Plans submitted by South Africa's Metros under the Cities Support Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Erasmus</td>
<td>Director: Strategy and International Affairs for The Office of the City Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Lund</td>
<td>Chief Financial Officer - Madulammoho Social Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland Hunter</td>
<td>Former CFO of the City of Johannesburg</td>
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